2019 - 2020 / Cuarta edición

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Browsing 2019 - 2020 / Cuarta edición by Subject "Bioética"

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    Aproximaciones a un Sistema Social Global
    (2020) Zonenszain Laiter, Yael
    Para Martin Buber, el ser individual aparece cuando se contrasta con otros seres individuales, pero la persona aparece cuando entra en relación con otras personas, en el binomio “Tú-Yo”. La reciprocidad personal es el encuentro entre dos seres humanos, que se confirman mutuamente. Buber describe una “limitación normativa” como el problema que surge cuando la situación no permite que la reciprocidad sea completa entre dos personas y la relación no es totalmente mutua, ya que las dos personas no se encuentran en una situación de igualdad. En el paciente diagnosticado con muerte encefálica, la relación Yo-Tú ya existe, y con anterioridad se ha reconocido a aquel paciente como el “otro” en una relación de reciprocidad, aunque se presenta una limitación normativa en la que no existe reciprocidad completa.
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    Crítica al concepto de muerte encefálica
    (2020) Zonenszain, Yael
    "Los avances médicos, especialmente aquellos relacionados con el trasplante de órganos, han conducido a una nueva definición del concepto e muerte de la persona: la muerte encefálica como equivalente a la muerte humana. Esto acarrea diversos problemas de índole ética, que no han sido plenamente analizados por la disciplina de la bioética. El objetivo de este trabajo es demostrar que el criterio de muerte encefálica no es un criterio definitorio, sino pronóstico de la muerte humana, en el que sólo se alteran los derechos que se le deben al individuo, aunque siempre seguirá siendo persona. "
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    Dalla bioetica alla tecno-etica: nuove sfide al diritto
    (2020) Palazzani, Laura
    "The acceleration of scientific discoveries and technological applications opens up new possibilities for interventions on human life at different stages of development, in different existential conditions. The techno-scientific development raises ethical questions which require an urgent epistemological and philosophical reflection. Due to an anthropological and ethical pluralism, the answers to the techno-scientific questions may be very different. Moral positions differ as far as the justification of principles and values is concerned, and also, with regard to the justification of the balancing of values in conflicting situations. The problematic techno-scientific development on the one hand and, at the same time, the ethical pluralism on the other, give rise to new issues concerning regulation, on a national and international level. There is an increasing need in present day society all over the world for a certain kind of ‘governance’, through juridical regulations, related to scientific and technological progress. It aims to regulate new and emerging rights, above all at the beginning of life (reproductive technologies, genetic diagnosis, genetic manipulations) and end of life (euthanasia, living will, therapeutic obstinacy), in the field of cure and experimentation (with a specific focus on vulnerable populations, as children, women, immigrants) and in the so called emerging technologies (gene-editing, neurosciences, ICT, robotics, artificial intelligence). The focus of the book is the analysis, on a theoretical and practical level, of all the main bioethical and biolegal issues of the present discussion. On the level of theories, the main perspectives are analysed: the focus is the critical analysis of the libertarian, and the utilitarian theorization, and the foundation of the personalist model, which is grounded on the ontological recognition of the human being as a person. According to the personalist model, biolaw and governance cannot and should not be neutral, that is, without ethics, in the context of ethical pluralism. The personalist perspective thematises the doctrine of human rights as rooted in the principle of equality, recognizing that each human being, for the fact of being human, cannot become the object of discrimination. Each human being must be treated as a subject having an intrinsic dignity irrespective of other extrinsic considerations, related to the stage of psycho-physical development reached or the capabilities and abilities they express, such as self-determination (in the libertarian and liberal perspective) or the perception of a certain quality of life (in the utilitarian approach). This is the epistemological effort, particularly complex in bioethics, necessary for the recognition of rights at the borders of life, in front of the rapid progress of biomedical science and technology. The pointthat needs a special reflection is the recognition of the dignity of those who - due to accidental or provisional reasons, such as age, phase of development or conditions of illness, temporary or stable - are not able to carry out certain abilities or do so weakly, thus becoming particularly vulnerable and fragile when faced with the pressures of the progress made in biotechnology toward ‘perfection’."